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Reply To “Comment on ‘Quantum String Seal Is Insecure’ ”
H. F. Chau∗
Department of Physics, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong and
Center of Theoretical and Computational Physics,
University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
(Dated: January 1, 2019)
In Phys. Rev. A 76, 056301 (2007), He claimed that the proof in my earlier paper [Phys. Rev.
A 75, 012327 (2007)] is insufficient to conclude the insecurity of all quantum string seals because
my measurement strategy cannot obtain non-trivial information on the sealed string and escape
detection at the same time. Here, I clarify that our disagreement comes from our adoption of
two different criteria on the minimum amount of information a quantum string seal can reveal to
members of the public. I also point out that He did not follow my measurement strategy correctly.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.20.Ff, 89.70.+c
In Ref. [1], He said that the key measurement strategy
used in my paper [2] to show the insecurity of all quantum
string seals was in the form
Qi0 = a(ν)I + b(ν)|i〉〈i| . (1)
(See Eq. (29) in Ref. [2].) He then attempted to find a
“loophole” in my conclusion by means of two “counter-
example” quantum string seals.
His first scheme (Scheme A) is a family of quantum
string seals each with a different sealed string length.
In Scheme A, each bit in a string is independently en-
coded as a publicly accessible state in the form cos θi|bi〉+
sin θi|b¯i〉, where bi is the value of the bit and |θi| ≤ Θ/nα.
Here Θ ≪ pi/4 and α < 1/2 are two positive constants,
and n is the bit string length. The probabilities of cor-
rectly determining a particular bit of the string and the
entire string are ≈ cos2(Θ/nα) and ≈ cos2n(Θ/nα), re-
spectively [1, 3]. In other words, as n→∞, the chance of
correctly finding out the entire string is negligible even
though the percentage of correctly determined bits ap-
proaches 1. Furthermore, the number of incorrectly de-
termined bits increases without bound in the large n
limit. In his second scheme (Scheme B), the classical
message i is encoded as a publicly accessible quantum
state
∑
j λij |j〉. He claimed that (the magnitudes of)
λij ’s should be very small (large) if the contents of the
messages i and j were irrelevant (close) [1]. In both
schemes, He said that to follow the instructions in my
paper [2], a member of the public (Bob) had to apply the
measurement operators in the form Qi0’s to each encoded
qubit. Nevertheless, this measurement strategy has little
chance to obtain non-trivial information on the sealed
string and escape detection simultaneously. He further
claimed that Bob is extremely likely to be caught when
the parameter ν used in Qi0 approaches 1 because the
maximum probability of correctly determining the entire
sealed string can be made arbitrarily small by increas-
ing n [1]. One can judge the validity of He’s claim by
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answering the following two questions: What is the min-
imum (classical) information a quantum string seal can
reveal to Bob? And is He really using my measurement
strategy reported in Ref. [2] in both schemes?
To answer the first question, let us recall that the ob-
jective of a quantum seal is to allow detection of Bob’s
measurement with a high probability without concealing
the sealed message [4]. There are at least three possible
ways to define what is the meaning of non-concealment
in this context; and I list them in the order of decreasing
ability to recover the sealed message.
Criterion A. There is a measurement for Bob in such
a way that the conditional entropy Hcond of the
sealed message given the measurement results is
less than a fixed non-negative number Hcrit inde-
pendent of the string length n. Moreover, the mu-
tual information I between the sealed message and
the measurement result divided by the entropyH of
the sealed message is of the order of 1. Thus the ex-
pected number of bits whose values are wrongly de-
termined by Bob is finite even though Bob’s chance
of correctly determining the entire sealed string can
be low.
Criterion B. The value Hcond/H → 0 (and hence
I/H → 1) in the limit of n → ∞. In other words,
the percentage of incorrectly determined bits ap-
proaches 0 in the large n limit although the number
of incorrectly determined bits may approach infin-
ity.
Criterion C. The value Hcond/H < c (and hence
I/H ≥ 1− c in the large n limit, where c is a fixed
positive number of order of 1. That is, the percent-
age of incorrectly determined bits is bounded by a
non-zero value in the large n limit.
Clearly, Scheme A proposed by He satisfies Criterion B
but not Criterion A. Furthermore, independently sealing
each bit of a classical string by an imperfect quantum bit
seal is an example of a family of quantum seals obeying
only Criterion C.
2A major source of the disagreement between He and
myself comes from the fact that I have adopted Crite-
rion A while He used the more lenient Criterion B. I be-
lieve that it is more natural to adopt the non-concealment
Criterion A as the expected Hamming distance between
the Bob’s measurement result and the sealed message is
bounded. Since most of the discussion in Ref. [2] was
focused on sealing a fixed finite number of possible mes-
sages N , the distinction between the above three possible
non-concealment criteria was not clearly made there.
Now I answer the second question: Is He using my mea-
surement strategy reported in Ref. [2] in his analysis? As
I have already pointed out in the second page of Ref. [2]
that the maximum probability for Bob to correctly de-
termine the entire sealed string can be small. Thus the
first step in constructing the measurement strategy for a
quantum string seal is to find a partition P of the set of
all possible sealed messages so that the maximum prob-
ability for Bob to correctly determine which element in
the partition does the sealed message belong to pmax is
of the order of 1. In the case of Scheme A, a possible
choice is to partition the N = 2n possible values of the
sealed bit string according to the values of its first n2α
bits. In the large n limit, pmax for this choice equals
exp(−Θ2) > 0.5. In addition, such a probability can be
attained by measuring the first n2α qubits in the standard
basis and keeping the remaining qubits untouched; and
contrary to He’s claim of using Qi0’s, my measurement
strategy reported in Ref. [2] is to apply the measure-
ment operators Mi(ν)’s defined by Eqs. (11) and (12)
in Ref. [2]. It is straight-forward to check that using
these measurement operators, Bob can obtain n2α bits
of information on the sealed string and escape detection
with at least 0.52 = 0.25 chance simultaneously for any
1/2 ≤ ν ≤ 1. That is, as n→∞, the amount of informa-
tion on the sealed message obtained is infinite although
the percentage of information obtained is 0. A compari-
son of my measurement strategy on families of quantum
seals satisfying the three different non-concealment cri-
teria are tabulated in Table I. In particular, only by
adopting Criterion A is it always possible to find a parti-
tion P satisfying log |P| . logN and pmax is of the order
of 1.
Let me further clarify. Measurement operators Mi’s
can be applied to any quantum string seal to obtain in-
formation with a high chance of escaping detection. In
contrast,Qi0’s in the form of Eq. (1) are the measurement
operators that maximize the average fidelity between the
measured state and the sealed state for a special quan-
tum string seal designed to prove Theorem 1 in Ref. [2]
only. In fact, for a general quantum string seal, the mea-
surement operators that maximize the average fidelity
between the measured state and the sealed state need
not be in the form Qi0’s. One example is the (perfect)
quantum string seal that encodes the classical message
i as |φi〉 ≡
∑N−1
j=0 ω
ij
N |j〉/
√
N for all i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
where ωN is a primitive Nth root of unity. Clearly, one
can correctly obtain the entire sealed message without
Criterion Hcond
Hcond
H
log |P|a
log |P|
n
b
A < Hcrit 0
+∞, scales linearly
with n
1
B ≤ +∞ 0
+∞, but may scale
sublinearly with n
can be 0 in
the worst case
C ≤ +∞ ≥ 0 can be finite in the
worst case
can be 0 in
the worst case
aHence also the scaling of the average number of bits that can be
extracted without being caught.
bHence also the scaling of the number of bits that can be extracted
without being caught divided by the string length.
TABLE I: Properties of families of quantum seals satisfying
different non-concealment criteria in the limit n→∞.
being caught using the projective measurement opera-
tors |φi〉〈φi|’s [5, 6]. Besides, these operators are not in
the form of Eq. (1). This example also shows that, con-
trary to He’s claim in the security analysis of Scheme B
[1], it is possible that the magnitudes of λij ’s are all equal
for all i, j.
In conclusion, it is the adoption of different non-
concealment criteria that causes the disagreement be-
tween He and myself on the security of quantum string
seals. Moreover, the issue is further complicated by He’s
misuse of Qi0’s as the measurement operator in his se-
curity analysis. As shown in Table I, all quantum string
seals are insecure if the non-concealment Criterion A is
used. However, some quantum string seals are secure if
non-concealment Criteria B or C is used in the large n
limit. Note further that in the case of adopting Crite-
rion C, even an honest Bob can obtain only a fraction of
the sealed message in the large n limit.
Finally, I remark on passing that He’s claim in Ref. [1]
that by linearity, the operator αI+β|i〉〈i| actually meant
applying the identity operator with a certain probability
is incorrect. This is because the state α|ψ〉 + β〈i|ψ〉|i〉
does not equal a mixture of pure states |ψ〉 and |i〉.
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